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Two protocols of quantum direct communication with authentication [Phys. Rev. A 73, 042305(2006)] were recently 
indicated to be insecure against the authenticator Trent’s attacks [Phys. Rev. A 75, 026301(2007)]. We present two efficient 
protocols by using four Pauli operations, which are secure against inner Trent’s attacks as well as outer Eve’s attacks. Finally, 
we generalize them to multiparty quantum direction communication.  
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Since Wiesner [1] and then Bennett et al.[2] found that 
quantum effects can be used to transmit secrete information 
in an open quantum channel, a remarkable surge of interest 
in the international scientific and industrial community has 
propelled quantum cryptography communication into 
mainstream of computer science and physics. Quantum key 
distribution (QKD) is the earliest and most mature branch of 
the mainstream, which provides a novel way for two 
legitimate parties to share a common secret key over a long 
distance with negligible leakage of information to the 
eavesdropper. Its ultimate advantage is the unconditional 
security. Hence, after Bennett and Brassard published BB84 
protocol [3], a variety of QKD protocols have been proposed, 
such as E91 [4], B92 [5], and six-state protocol [6] etc. And 
the security of some QKD protocols was theoretically 
proven [7-9].  
Recently, a new concept of quantum cryptography 
communication, quantum secure direct communication 
(QSDC), was proposed. Different from QKD, the 
deterministic QSDC protocol is to transmit directly the 
secret message without generating a random key to encrypt 
them, so it is more demanding on security. In 2002, Beige et 
al. presented the pioneering quantum secure direct 
communication scheme with singlet photon [10], then 
Bostrom and Felbingeer put forward a “Ping-pong” protocol 
with EPR state [11]. Since then, many other QSDC protocols 
have been proposed [12-24]. These QSDC protocols can 
protect against eavesdropping attack called passive attack in 
cryptography [25], while they cannot resist other kind of 
attack, named active attack, such as the impersonation attack, 
the man-in-the-middle attack etc. To make up these 
shortcomings, recently Lee, Lim and Yang proposed two 
QSDC protocols of quantum direct communication with 
authentication (Lee-Lim-Yang protocols) [26]. However, 
Zhang, Liu and Wang et al. indicated that these protocols  
were insecure against the authenticator Trent’s attacks, and 
put forward two modified protocols by using the operation 
zσ  instead of the operation X (Zhang-Liu-Wang protocols)  
[27].  
In this letter, we improve Lee-Lim-Yang protocols and 
Zhang-Liu-Wang protocols, and propose two novel efficient 
QSDC protocols with authentication (EQSDCPs). Our 
revised EQSDCPs have no need to perform the Hadamard 
operation H. They get twice transition efficiency by utilizing 
four kinds of Pauli operation ( I , xσ , yiσ , zσ ), and 
transmit two bits every GHZ state. What is more, these two 
EQSDCPs show the same security as Lee-Lim-Yang 
protocols when Trent is honest, and also are secure against 
Zhang-Liu-Wang’s Trent attacks when Trent is dishonest.  
Let us start by illustrating some notations. We firstly 
define eight GHZ states as 
1 (| 000 |111 )
2
P± = 〉± 〉 ,  1 (| 001 |110 )
2
Q± = 〉± 〉 , 
1 (| 010 |101 )
2
R± = 〉± 〉 ,  1 (| 011 |100 )
2
S ± = 〉± 〉 ,  (1) 
and four Bell states (EPR pairs) as 
1 (| 00 |11 )
2
φ± = 〉± 〉 ,  1 (| 01 |10 )
2
ψ ± = 〉± 〉 .     (2) 
Suppose three parties, Alice, Bob and Trent, share a GHZ 
triplet 
ATB ATB
Pϕ += , where the subscripts A, T and B 
correspond to Alice, Trent and Bob, respectively. And 
ATB
ϕ can be rewritten as follows: 
1 (| 000 |111 )
2
1 (| | | | )
2
ATB ATBATB
AB T AB T
ϕ
φ φ+ −
= 〉 + 〉
= 〉 +〉 + 〉 −〉
,           (3) 
where 1 (| 0 |1 )
2
+ = 〉+ 〉  and 1 (| 0 |1 )
2
− = 〉− 〉 . 
Our EQSDCPs are composed of two parts: one is the 
  
authentication process, and the other is the direct 
communication process with dense coding. There are three 
parties, Alice and Bob are the two legitimate users of the 
communication, and Trent is the third party who will be used 
to authenticate the two users. And Trent is assumed to be 
more powerful than the other two parties and supplies the 
GHZ states. 
The purpose of the authentication process is to let the 
three participants safely share GHZ states. Similar to 
Ref.[26], we suppose Trent is a trusted third party, and he 
shares a secret identity number IDuser and a one-way hash 
function h with the legitimate users. Here the hash function 
is 
:{0,1} {0,1} {0,1}l m nh × → ,                (4) 
where l, m and n denote the length of the identity number, 
the length of a counter, and the length of authentication key, 
respectively. Thus the user’s authentication key can be 
expressed as AKuser=h(IDuser, cuser), where cuser is the counter 
of calls on the hash function. When the user want to continue 
next authentication process, he can get a new authentication 
key by only adding the counter number, and does not change 
his ID. In the authentication process, Trent performs 
authentication with Alice by using Alice’s authentication key 
AKA=h(IDA, cA), and with Bob by using Bob’s authentication 
key AKB=h(IDB, cB). The brief procedure is as follows:  
(1) Prerequisite. Alice and Bob register their secret 
identities and hash functions with Trent.  
(2) Trent generates a GHZ triplets sequence 
1 2| { , , , }nϕ ϕ ϕΨ >= " , suppose 
 1 (| 000 |111 ) ( 1,2, , )
2i ATB ATB
i Nϕ = 〉 + 〉 = " .       (5) 
(3) Trent makes unitary operations on iϕ  with Alice’s 
and Bob’s authentication keys AKA and AKB. For example, if 
the ith value of AKA is 0, then Trent makes an identity 
operation I  on Alice’s particle (the first particle) of the ith 
GHZ state. If it is 1, a Hadamard operation H is applied. 
(4) Trent distributes the first particle, the third particle of 
every GHZ triplets to Alice and Bob, respectively, and keeps 
remaining particles for him. 
(5) Alice and Bob make reverse operations of step (3) on 
their qubits with their authentication keys AKA and AKB, 
respectively.  
(6) Alice and Bob choose a subset of GHZ states for 
checking eavesdropper. If the error rate is higher than 
expected, then Alice and Bob resume the process. Otherwise, 
they can confirm that their counter parts are legitimate and 
the channel is secure, so they can continue the next phase, 
quantum direct communication process.  
After above authentication process, the GHZ states are 
safely shared among the three parties, and two EQSDCPs 
will be put forward to transmit the secret message. We depict 
our EQSDCP 1 firstly.  
In EQSDCP 1, the scenario is that Alice wants to send 
secret message to distant Bob, and there is a quantum 
channel between Alice and Bob. To achieve this task, Alice 
encodes the secret message on her particles and directly 
transmits them to Bob as follows: 
(1) Alice selects randomly some particles of the remaining 
GHZ states after authentication, and performs on them 
randomly one of the four operations ( I , xσ , yiσ , zσ ). The 
number of such particles is not big as long as it can provide 
an analysis of the error rate. Only Alice knows the positions 
of these sampling particles and she keeps them secret. 
(2) Alice encodes the secret message with an error 
correction code (ECC), such as the Hamming code, the 
Reed-Solomon code, the CSS (Calderbank-Shor-Steane) 
code, or BCH (Bose-Chaudhuri-Hochquenghem) code, so 
that Bob can correct errors after transmission. 
(3) Alice encodes the ECC-encoded message on the 
remanding particles after step(2) by performing the four 
unitary operations. According to our dense coding strategy, 
two bits correspond to a unitary operation: the bits 00 
corresponds to the operation I , 01 to xσ , 10 to yiσ , and 11 
to zσ .  
0 0 1 1 ,I = +    x 0 1 1 0 ,σ = +  
y 0 1 1 0 ,iσ = −   0 0 1 1 .zσ = −     (6) 
Then the GHZ states are transformed into different forms as 
follows. 
(a) If the bits are 00, then  
1 (| 000 |111 )
2
1 {| | | | }
2
A ATB ATB
AB T AB T
I ϕ
φ φ+ −
= 〉 + 〉
= 〉 +〉 + 〉 −〉
.       (7) 
(b) If the bits are 01, then 
xA
1 (|100 | 011 )
2
1 (| | | | )
2
ATB ATB
AB T AB T
σ ϕ
ψ ψ+ −
= 〉 + 〉
= 〉 +〉 − 〉 −〉
.       (8) 
(c) If the bits are 10, then 
y
1 (| 011 |100 )
2
1 (| | | | )
2
A ATB ATB
AB T AB T
iσ ϕ
ψ ψ− +
= 〉 − 〉
= 〉 +〉 − 〉 −〉
.       (9) 
(d) If the bits are 11, then 
zA
1 (| 000 |111 )
2
1 {| | | | }
2
ATB ATB
AB T AB T
σ ϕ
φ φ− +
= 〉 − 〉
= 〉 +〉 + 〉 −〉
.        (10) 
(4) After finishing all unitary operations, Alice sends all 
the qubits to Bob. 
(5) Bob makes Bell measurement on pairs of particles 
consisting of his qubit and Alice’s qubit. 
(6) Trent measures her qubit in the x basis { , }+ −  and 
publishes the measurement outcomes. 
(7) Bob can recover Alice’s secret bits from Bob’s and 
Trent’s outcomes (shown in Table 1). For example, when 
Bob’s measurement is |ψ +〉  and Trent’s publication is | +〉 , 
Bob can infer that Alice performed a xσ  operation and the 
bits she sent are 01. Note that these decoded bits consist of 
the sampling particles’ bits and the secret message. 
(8) Alice tells Bob the position of the sampling pairs and 
the type of unitary operations on them. Then Bob check the 
  
sampling pairs that Alice had chosen, and he will get an 
estimate of error rate in the transmission. 
(9) If the error rate is reasonably low, Alice and Bob can 
trust the process. Then Bob gets rid of the sample particles, 
and gets secret bits encoded with the corresponding ECC 
code. Otherwise, Alice and Bob abandon the transmission. 
(10) Bob does error correction on the remanding bits, and 
finally gets the secret message from Alice. 
 In this message transmission process, even if Eve exists, 
but she at most get one particle from a GHZ state, and could 
not distinguish which operation Alice had performed, so she 
couldn’t get any secret message.  
Table 1 
The corresponding relations of Alice’s operation, Bob’s measurement and 
Trent’s publication in EQSDCP 1 
Trent’s publication Bob’s measurement Alice’s operation 
| T+〉  | ABφ+ 〉  I (00) 
| T+〉  | ABψ +〉  xσ (01) 
| T+〉  | ABψ −〉  yiσ (10) 
| T+〉  | ABφ−〉  zσ (11) 
| T−〉  | ABφ−〉  I (00) 
| T−〉  | ABψ −〉  xσ (01) 
| T−〉  | ABψ +〉  yiσ (10) 
| T−〉  | ABφ+ 〉  zσ (11) 
In EQSDCP 2, the scenario is that Alice wants to send 
secret message to distant Bob, but there is not any quantum 
channel between Alice and Bob. To achieve this task, Alice 
encodes the message on her particles and transmits them to 
Trent, instead of Bob. So Trent is acting as the message 
transfer center.  
The detailed procedure is similar to EQSDCP 1, except 
that Alice transmits her particles to Trent in step (4), Bob 
makes x basis measurement in step (5), and Trent performs 
Bell measurement in step (6). Finally, Bob can infer the 
secret message according to Trent’s measurement and his 
measurement (see Table 2). 
Table 2 
The corresponding relations of Alice’s operation, Bob’s measurement and 
Trent’s announcement in EQSDCP 2  
Trent’s 
announcement 
Bob’s 
measurement 
Alice’s operation 
| ATφ+ 〉  | B+〉  I (00) 
| ATφ+ 〉  | B−〉  zσ (11) 
| ATψ +〉  | B+〉  xσ (01) 
| ATψ +〉  | B−〉  yiσ (10) 
| ATφ−〉  | B+〉  zσ (11) 
| ATφ−〉  | B−〉  I (00) 
| ATψ −〉  | B+〉  yiσ (10) 
| ATψ −〉  | B−〉  xσ (01) 
As we know, Lee-Lim-Yang protocols are secure against 
Eve’s attacks when Trent is honest, and the security proof 
was given in Ref [26]. Our EQSDCPs are similar to the 
Lee-Lim-Yang protocols when Trent is honest. So, What we 
need do is to prove that the EQSDCPs are secure against 
Zhang-Liu-Wang’s Trent attacks when Trent is dishonest. 
Let’s start with the first Zhang-Liu-Wang’s Trent attack to 
the first protocol, which is an intercept-resent attack. The 
procedure can be depicted as follows. At first, Trent 
intercepts the qubits that Alice attempts to transmit to Bob, 
and performs the H operation on each qubit. Then Trent 
measures Alice’s and his qubit in the z basis {|0>, |1>} 
separately. If the two outcomes are the same, then Trent can 
deduce that Alice had performed an H operation 
corresponding to the bit 0. Otherwise, Alice had performed 
an HX operation corresponding to the bit 1. So, Trent will 
get Alice’s whole bits string including both the random bits 
string and the secret message. Finally Trent removes the 
random bits according to Alice’s publication in step(8), and 
completely know the secret message.  
According to this attack strategy, Trent intercepts Alice’s 
particle, and respectively performs his qubit and Alice’s 
qubit in the z basis. From these measurement outcomes, 
Trent can not know which unitary operations had been 
performed on Alice’s qubits. For example, if the outcomes of 
Trent’s and Alice’s are the same, the possible operation is 
AI  or zAσ (see equation (7), (10)). If the outcomes are 
different, the possible operation is xAσ  or yAiσ (see equation 
(8), (9)).  
Even if Trent performs the H operation before singlet 
measurement, and the states are transformed into 
1 (| 000 |111 )
2
1{| 000 |100 | 011 |111 }
2
A A A ATB ATB
ATB ATB ATB ATB
H I Hϕ = 〉 + 〉
= 〉 + 〉 + 〉 − 〉
,  (11) 
xA
1 (|100 | 011 )
2
1{| 000 |100 | 011 |111 }
2
A A ATB ATB
ATB ATB ATB ATB
H Hσ ϕ = 〉 + 〉
= 〉 − 〉 + 〉 + 〉
,  (12) 
y
1 (| 011 |100 )
2
1{| 011 |111 | 000 |100 },
2
A A A ATB ATB
ATB ATB ATB ATB
H i Hσ ψ = 〉 − 〉
= 〉 + 〉 − 〉 + 〉
,  (13) 
zA
1 (| 000 |111 )
2
1{| 000 |100 | 011 |111 }
2
A A ATB ATB
ATB ATB ATB ATB
H Hσ ψ = 〉 − 〉
= 〉 + 〉 − 〉 + 〉
.   (14) 
As shown above, Trent is still unable to differentiate which 
operation had been performed by comparing the outcomes of 
Alice’s and Trent’s measurement. This means Trent cannot 
infer Alice’s secret message, so our revised EQSDCP 1 is 
secure against Zhang-Liu-Wang’s Trent attack. 
The second Zhang-Liu-Wang’s Trent attack to the 
protocol 2 can be depicted as follows. Trent performs an H 
operation on each qubit he received from Alice, and then 
respectively measures his qubit and Alice’s qubit in the z 
basis to extract the secret message. According to the 
equation (7-10) and the equation (11-13), Trent can not get 
the secrete message whether the H operation is performed or 
not. In short, our second EQSDCP is secure against 
Zhang-Liu-Wang’s Trent attack too. 
In addition, our protocols can be generalized to multiparty 
  
quantum direction communication. A simple example is the 
three-party efficient QSDC protocols (3EQSDCPs) by using 
four particles GHZ state. Suppose the four-particle GHZ is  
4
1 (| 0000 |1111 )
2
1 (| | | | )
2
ABTC ABTC
ABC T ABC TP P
ϕ
+ −
= 〉 + 〉
= 〉 +〉 + 〉 −〉
.        (15) 
And the scenario is that two spatially separated parties Alice 
and Bob want to send messages to distant Charlie. At first, 
Trent distributes three particles of four-particle GHZ state to 
Alice, Bob and Charlie separately by utilizing the 
authentication process. Similarly, we can design two 
3EQSDCPs. In the first 3EQSDCP, Alice encodes her 
message with IA (00), xAσ  (01), yAiσ  (10), zAσ  (11), Bob 
encodes his message with IB(0), xBσ (1), then Alice and Bob 
simultaneously send their particles to Charlie. After 
Charlie’s GHZ measurement and Trent’s x measurement, 
Charlie will get the secret messages from Alice and Bob 
according to Table 3. 
In the second 3EQSDCP, Alice and Bob simultaneously 
transmit their particles to Trent respectively after message 
encoding, and Charlie can extract the secret messages from 
Alice and Bob, respectively (see Table 4). 
In this letter, we present two revised efficient protocols, 
which are more efficient than Ref. [25, 26] and secure 
against Zhang-Liu-Wang’s Trent attacks. Finally, we 
generalize them to multiparty quantum secure direction 
communication. 
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Table 3 
The relations of Alice’s operation, Bob’s operation, Trent’s publication, and 
Charlie’s measurement in the first 3EQSDCP. 
Trent’s 
publication 
Charlie’s 
measurement 
Alice’s 
operation 
Bob’s 
operation 
| T+〉  | ABCP+ 〉  AI (00) BI (0) 
| T+〉  | ABCS + 〉  xAσ (01) BI (0) 
| T+〉  | ABCS − 〉  yAiσ (10) BI (0) 
| T+〉  | ABCP− 〉  zAσ (11) BI (0) 
| T−〉  | ABCP− 〉  AI (00) BI (0) 
| T−〉  | ABCS − 〉  xAσ (01) BI (0) 
| T−〉  | ABCS + 〉  yAiσ (10) BI (0) 
| T−〉  | ABCP+ 〉  zAσ (11) BI (0) 
| T+〉  | ABCR+ 〉  AI (00) xBσ (1) 
| T+〉  | ABCQ+ 〉  xAσ (01) xBσ (1) 
| T+〉  | ABCQ− 〉  yAiσ (10) xBσ (1) 
| T+〉  | ABCR− 〉  zAσ (11) xBσ (1) 
| T−〉  | ABCR− 〉  AI (00) xBσ (1) 
| T−〉  | ABCQ− 〉  xAσ (01) xBσ (1) 
| T−〉  | ABCQ+ 〉  yAiσ (10) xBσ (1) 
| T−〉  | ABCR+ 〉  zAσ (11) xBσ (1) 
Table 4 
The relations of Alice’s operation, Bob’s operation, Trent’s announcement, 
and Charlie’s measurement in the second 3EQSDCP. 
Trent’s 
announcement 
Charlie’s 
measurement 
Alice’s 
operation 
Bob’s 
operation 
| ABTP
+ 〉  | C+〉  AI (00) BI (0) 
| ABTP
+ 〉  | C−〉  zAσ (11) BI (0) 
| ABTS
+ 〉  | C+〉  xAσ (01) BI (0) 
| ABTS
+ 〉  | C−〉  yAiσ (10) BI (0) 
| ABTP
− 〉  | C+〉  zAσ (11) BI (0) 
| ABTP
− 〉  | C−〉  AI (00) BI (0) 
| ABTS
− 〉  | C+〉  yAiσ (10) BI (0) 
| ABTS
− 〉  | C−〉  xAσ (01) BI (0) 
| ABTR
+ 〉  | C+〉  AI (00) xBσ (1) 
| ABTR
+ 〉  | C−〉  zAσ (11) xBσ (1) 
| ABTQ
+ 〉  | C+〉  xAσ (01) xBσ (1) 
| ABTQ
+ 〉  | C−〉  yAiσ (10) xBσ (1) 
| ABTQ
− 〉  | C+〉  yAiσ (10) xBσ (1) 
| ABTQ
− 〉  | C−〉  xAσ (01) xBσ (1) 
| ABTR
− 〉  | C+〉  zAσ (11) xBσ (1) 
| ABTR
− 〉  | C−〉  AI (00) xBσ (1) 
 
